Tiger closed its 16th fund at $2.2 billion, falling short of its $6 billion target.

Tiger Global may have raised a fund, but I wouldn’t say it’s roaring.

Tiger last week closed its 16th fund at $2.2 billion, a stark miss next to its $6 billion target. It’s also a far cry from the $12.7 billion fund that Tiger closed in 2021.

To me, there’s a natural question here—is this a macro problem or a Tiger-specific problem? The answer, of course, is that it’s both. Tiger’s smaller fund is both a sign of the times and reflective of how the firm’s LP relationships may be shifting.

PitchBook analyst Kyle Stanford noted to Term Sheet via email that macro problems are, “a big factor in how LPs deploy capital…and when they assess their options, late-stage/growth venture investment likely isn’t looking as appetizing as it was in the past,” he said.

Suboptimal though it may be, there’s absolutely precedent for a firm to miss fundraising targets, especially in tough markets. One case in point, Carlyle. In 2018 its $18.5 billion fund blasted past targets and the company touted it as the “largest in the firm’s history.” But by 2023 it was a very different story. On the firm’s November earnings call, Carlyle CEO Harvey Schwartz told analysts outright: “Overall, we've not been pleased with our pace of fundraising, thus far, in 2023.” In August, Carlyle closed its 8th flagship fund at $14.8 billion—far from the up to $27 billion reportedly targeted in 2021 under a previous CEO.

And the list goes on from there. In June, Insight Partners raised $2 billion for its 13th fund, a massive cut from the original $20 billion target. In July, it was reported that Coatue raised $331 million for its early-stage-focused fund, missing its target by more than 30%. Apollo, TPG, and TCV have all missed or slashed targets for their flagship funds within the last 12 months.

On the other hand, this is about Tiger too. The private equity business recently underwent a leadership change, with Scott Shleifer transitioning to an advisor role in November and founder Chase Coleman retaking the helm. Tiger actively decided to stop marketing the fund six months ago, opting to close it at this size and keep their focus on performance, a source familiar with the matter told Fortune. (Tiger declined to comment for this article.)

Tiger also likely has a rough 2021 valuation hangover. “They’ve been burned by the poor exit environment and the declining valuations,” added PitchBook’s Stanford. “Tiger deployed its previous fund at a very fast pace (that is probably an understatement). They were kind of left holding the bag.”

“In 2021, Tiger backed the equivalent of nearly one startup every day—including weekends,” my colleagues Jessica Mathews and Anne Sraders wrote in a September deep dive on the firm.

Of course, Tiger’s not alone in its fast-paced, late-stage, go-go-go strategy—but it does for many exemplify that strategy. Tiger’s miss here brings into relief the way in which a firm can echo the startups it invests in—especially in tough times, burn rate matters. In a limited liquidity environment, LPs have been increasingly concerned with how their GPs are pacing, and are encouraging slower deployment, one source who works closely with LPs told Term Sheet.

“LPs are looking for discipline in every sense of the word,” the source said. “Not just ‘what valuation are you investing at?’ but ‘what’s your capital deployment pace?’”

Nevertheless, $2.2 billion remains $2.2 billion, which means Tiger’s going to be out there with substantial dry powder.

“I think the market wants to jump on Tiger for not being able to raise another $10 billion fund, or even the $6 billion it set out to raise,” said Stanford via email. But, he added, “At the very least, $2.2 billion is an impressive-sized venture fund.”

See you tomorrow,

Allie Garfinkle
Twitter: @agarfinks
Email: alexandra.garfinkle@fortune.com
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This story was originally featured on Fortune.com